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PROLOGUE: THE PERSONAL AND PROFEssIoNAL DILEMMA
As a Christian advocate for religious human rights, I am
acutely aware of the religious justifications for my position. How-
ever, as a Christian advocate for religious human rights, I am also
aware that many who share my religious beliefs do not share my
concern for human rights. Furthermore, as a Christian advocate
for religious human rights, I am likewise aware of the criticism
and hostility my Christian perspective engenders within some
segments of the secular human rights community.
Individuals on both "sides" of the debate may be accused of
a lack of understanding or tolerance for the perspective of the
other. For example, concerning my commitment to human
rights advocacy, one Christian asked me: "How did you get
involved with those communists?" Similarly, upon learning of
some of my conservative Christian beliefs, co-workers in a secular
human rights organization shuddered to think that I might have
anything in common with "the 'religious right' bigots."
* B.A., Wheaton College, Illinois, 1993; J.D. Candidate, 1999, LL.M.
Candidate, 2000, Notre Dame Law School. I dedicate this Note to all persons
living-and dying-under conditions of religious persecution throughout the
world, and to all who dedicate their efforts to the promotion and protection of
religious human rights. I also wish to express my appreciation to my parents,
Wesley and Margaret Mack, for their examples of love, faith, compassion, and
Christian witness in all settings; to Professors Paolo Carozza, Steven Smith, and
Rev. John Pearson, C.S.C., for their insightful suggestions regarding this Note;
and to Garth Meintjes, Associate Director of The Center for Civil and Human
Rights, for his example of commitment to justice, and for the opportunity to
remain active in the promotion of human rights, while here at Notre Dame Law
School.
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I do not attribute these extreme reactions to each Christian
or non-Christian who knows of my dedication to the field of
human rights, or even to the majority of those I have encoun-
tered. Indeed, perhaps more troubling and more frequent than
presumptive conclusions are the blank stares-Christians who
ask, with sincere ignorance, "What do you mean by human
rights?" or "Why should I care?"'-or secular human rights advo-
cates who stare at me in questioning disbelief, amazed to meet in
me a species they presumed to be either extinct or non-existent.2
Finding my identity in both "camps," mine is a uniquely dif-
ficult position-truly a "personal and professional dilemma."3 As
Kent Greenawalt has pointedly stated:
With some uncertainty and tentativeness, I hold religious
convictions, but I find myself in a pervasively secular disci-
pline. My convictions tell me that no aspect of life should
be wholly untouched by the transcendent reality in which I
believe, yet a basic premise of common legal argument is
that any reference to such a perspective is out of bounds.
4
How, therefore, should I rely on my religious convictions and
seek support from within my community of faith, and at the same
time work in a field seemingly dominated by either secularists or
those of a more liberal or nominal religious perspective, without
ostracizing myself from either side? My faith is immutably inte-
1. In my personal experience, Christians are becoming not only more
aware of, but also more active in advocacy of human rights, especially with
regard to the persecuted Christian church around the world. See discussion,
infra Part II.B, III.C.
2. A parallel may be drawn between the traditional secular human rights
community and academia, as described by Sanford Levinson: "[M]y life in the
elite legal academy has been basically devoid of contact with committed
Christians, especially evangelical Protestants. One can count literally on the
fingers of one hand the number of publically visible Protestant evangelicals who
hold tenured positions at America's 'leading' law schools." Sanford Levinson,
Some Reflections on Multiculturalism, "Equal Concern and Respect," and the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 989, 996 (1993).
Relating this observation to the human rights community, must we assume that
very few committed Christians are active participants in the field of human
rights? Or is it more likely that the committed Christians who are involved opt
not to discuss their faith or the religious rationale for their involvement? My
concern that the latter is the case contributes to my motivation for writing this
Note.
3. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 5
(1988) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONvICTIONS]. In describing his
dilemma, Greenawalt asks the following questions: "How far am I appropriately
guided by religious perspectives in my political decisions? How far are the
reasons I put forward for my actions, in terms of political advocacy,
appropriately religious?" Id. at 9.
4. Id. at 5.
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gral to who I am, what I do, where I go, and how I live. Any
suggestion that I put aside my faith and limit my decisions and
self-expression to secular reasoning and terminology, I consider
impossible.
Perhaps rather than consider my position a difficult one, I
should regard it as privileged. When met with presumptions,
misconceptions, or lack of understanding on either side, my dual
identity-Christian and human rights advocate-might serve to
educate, to familiarize, or to "humanize" or put a face to an as-of-
yet unencountered or misunderstood phenomenon. Perhaps by
drawing from both perspectives I can in some small way help to
bridge the chasm between the factions. More significantly, I may
succeed in identifying "common ground" that will help move the
pursuit of religious human rights one step closer to both justice
and truth.5
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this Note is to explore the extent to
which it is either possible or effective for me to rely upon and
express my identity as a Christian, as I advocate in the secular
arena for the promotion and protection of religious human
rights. In order to reach this objective, I first discuss the issue of
religious human rights from a general perspective. Part II, there-
fore, provides a foundational explanation of the meaning of
"religious human rights," and then discusses the current status
and protection of these rights. Part III moves to a discussion of
the relationship between the traditional international human
rights community and religious advocates of religious human
rights. My intent is to provide for the reader an understanding
of the setting in which I find myself-often caught in the gap
between the two sectors. Part III also identifies the causes of the
current lack of collaboration between the two groups, and dis-
cusses what both sectors have to offer, both to one another and
to the promotion of religious human rights.
Parts IV and V turn from this objective analysis of the field of
religious human rights to what may be the most distinctive and
potentially most helpful element of this Note-a subjective con-
5. Concerning justice and truth, Greenawalt states: "The appropriate
place of all these sorts of grounds turns partly on the possibility of resolving
political problems on the basis of shared premises ofjustice and shared criteria
for determining truth." Id In this statement, Greenawalt challenges the
presumption that justice and truth are merely a desired end result; greater
potential for success follows when these commonly shared principles are
integrated as part of the solution.
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templation regarding my role as a Christian in this field. Part IV
describes the religious, and more specifically, the Christian justi-
fication or basis for the promotion and advocacy of religious
human rights. Part V then considers whether I must "secularize"
my views in order to be an effective advocate for religious human
rights, or whether I may (or more strongly, whether I should)
continue to synthesize my religious rationale into my public
expression, as I work within the secular human rights
community.
My conclusion is that I must fully retain both identities-and
further, the two must be fully integrated into both my private
reasoning and public expression. In order to be an effective
advocate to those who do not share my religious perspective, I
must learn to express what I believe in secular terms. I should
not, however, hide behind this necessarily secularized language
or deny that mine is a uniquely Christian perspective. Doing so
will only further entrench the misconceptions and presumptions
that currently prevent the Christian and the secular advocates
from truly working together to fight oppression and seek justice.
I believe that only through the total integration of my Chris-
tian foundation with my attempts to identify shared common
ground will my efforts be truly effective-in the short-term by
gaining support from both sides and in the long-term by increas-
ing understanding to help forge a partnership better able to
fight for justice and the elimination of religious persecution.
1I. RELIGIOUs HuMAN RIGHTS
A. What are "Religious Human Rights"?
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and reli-
gion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in pub-
lic or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship, and observance.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights6
Religious liberty, also referred to as freedom of religion or
religious human rights, is expressly recognized or protected in
every major international human rights instrument.7 Indeed,
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18, G.A. Res. 217 A
(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), reprinted in BAsic DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 21, 25 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1992) [hereinafter BAsIc DOCUMENTS].
7. Freedom of religion is provided for in the following:
Articles 1(2) and 55(c) of the U.N. Charter, Article 18 of the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article II of the Convention
1999] RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS & THE INT'L HUMAN RIGITS COMMUNITY 459
freedom of religion as a fundamental right is included in cove-
nants-international and domestic-signed to by almost every
nation, worldwide.8 Although the level of protection afforded
religious rights may vary from country to country,9 "the denial of
religious liberty is almost everywhere viewed as morally and
legally invalid."10
The focus of inquiry concerning whether an act of persecu-
tion is religious persecution per se is whether the victim's religious
belief (or non-belief)'1 is a significant component of the persecu-
tion suffered. This inquiry extends more deeply than simply
whether the persecuted individual is a religious person. For
example, the following instances of abuse do not constitute reli-
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime Genocide, Article 9
of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 1 of the 1950 UNESCO
Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Article 4 of the 1965
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Article 18 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Article 12 of the 1969 American Convention on
Human Rights, Principle VII of the 1975 Final Act of the Helsinki
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Article 8 of the
1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 7 of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration on
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, and Article 14 of the 1989 Convention on
the Rights of the Child.
Irwin Colter, Jewish NGOs and Religious Human Rights: A Case Study, in RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 235, 235-36
(Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS
PERSPECIvE S].
8. See Jimmy Carter, Preface, in RELIGIOUS HuMAN RiGHTS IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ix (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr.
eds. 1996) [hereinafter LEGAL PERSPECTIVES].
9. The various levels of protection in different countries may depend on
elements such as the following:
IT]he stability of political regimes, the nature and history of
traditional relationships between church and state, the degree of
religious pluralism at the local level, the nature of the dominant
religion or religions and its (their) internal commitment to religious
liberty and toleration, the history of interactions between religious
groups, and a variety of other factors.
W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework, in
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at 1, 2.
10. James E. Wood, Jr., An Apologia for Religious Human Rights, in
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 455, 456.
11. "[I]t is now generally accepted that 'religion or belief includes
theistic, non-theistic, and atheistic beliefs." ELIZABETH ODIO BENITO,
ELIMINATION OF ALL FoRms OF INTOLERANCE AND DISCRIMINATION BASED ON
RELIGION OR BELIEF para. 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26 (1987).
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gious persecution: the death of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi
Christians in Rwanda, where the genocide was ethnically based;12
the murder of priests and nuns engaged in human rights work in
Central America, where political affiliation determined who
would be subject to persecution; 13 and the discrimination of
members of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, who are discrimi-
nated against, not because of their religious beliefs, but because
of their ethnicity.14
Religious identity alone will seldom be the only indicator of
religious persecution, given that "religion is usually intertwined
with ethnic, political, territorial and economic concerns."1 "
Therefore, to determine whether discrimination or persecution
is a violation of a religious human right, one must ask the ques-
tion: If the victim were of a different religion or held other
beliefs, would he or she still be the subject of the persecution?
16
If yes, the persecution is not a violation of religious human rights
12. See PAUL MARSHALL, THEIR BLOOD CRIES OUT 250-51 (1997).
13. See id. at 251.
14. See David Little, Studying "Religious Human Rights": Methodological
Foundations, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at 45, 55.
15. Paul Marshall, The Persecution of Christians in the Contemporary World,
Presentation to the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of State on Religious
Freedom Abroad (July 2, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Marshall,
ACRFA Presentation].
In the same way that factors other than religion may indicate religious
persecution,
[r]eligious persecution is often an indicator that other human rights
are also at risk. Violations of religious freedom often signal other
human rights violations. Religious persecution creates a climate of
fear and intolerance, gives license to authoritarianism, embitters and
sometimes radicalizes persecuted groups, encourages irredentist
tendencies among religious minorities and majorities who fear the
violation of their rights by others, and foments instability.
ADVISORY COMM. ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ABROAD, INTERIM REPORT TO THE SEC-
RETARY OF STATE AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 14 (Jan. 23,
1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/980123_acrfa_
inteim.html> [hereinafter ACRFA REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM].
Other human rights violations often associated with religious persecution
include the following:
[T]he right to life, liberty and security of the person; the right to free-
dom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment; the right to freedom from discrimination; the right to a fair
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal; the
right to freedom of movement and residence; the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; freedom of assembly and association; and the
right to privacy.
Johan D. van der Vyver, Introduction, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at xi,
xlvi.
16. See Marshall, ACRFA Presentation, supra note 15.
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per se, although this in no way diminishes the severity of the viola-
tion in question.17
It is important to recognize that religious human rights
speak to both negative and positive freedoms. Religious liberty is
most commonly considered a negative freedom, protecting
against forced conversions or coerced adherence to certain
beliefs.18 However, the positive freedoms protected by religious
liberty-that is, the freedom to engage in activity or actions as
required by religion's precepts'9-are far more prevalent on a
daily basis. Therefore, in the same way that religious human
rights standards forbid persecution on the basis of a victim's
identity as a religious person, persecution limiting positive free-
doms must also be prohibited. Religious freedom must necessar-
ily guarantee the freedom to choose a religion (or no religion at
all) and to live according to the dictates of that religion. In sum-
mary, "[r]eligious human rights require the equality of all reli-
gions, as well as irreligion, before the law, and that, according to
the law, a citizen neither enjoys advantages nor suffers disadvan-
tages because of one's religious faith or identity."2
One unanswered question thus far is this: To what universal
standard of freedom of religion, if any, should all countries be
held?21 As the answer to this question is a work in progress and is
outside the scope of this Note, it is sufficient here to recognize
17. "[N]ot for a second should we forget that it is real persecution and
that real people, Christians and others, suffer it." MARSHALL, supra note 12, at
250.
18. See Tamds F61desi, The Main Problems of Religious Freedom in Eastern
Europe, in LEGAL PERSPECrIVES, supra note 8, at 243, 261 (as a negative freedom,
religious freedom "expresses the conviction that the citizen need not belong to
a church or religion, or conversely, that no one is compelled to identify with
certain ideologies, ideas, or convictions").
19. Discussed in the context of Christianity, "[s]ince religious freedom
involves the freedom to live out one's religion, it is also a question of what
Christians' faith leads them to be and to do, so that their actions rather than
their identity can become the object of others' rage." MARSHALL, supra note 12,
at 251.
20. Wood, supra note 10, at 455. Describing both positive and negative
freedom, Wood states:
By religious human rights are meant the inherent right of a
person in public or in private to worship or not to worship according
to one's own conscience, understanding, or preferences; to profess
and to propagate one's faith; to join in association with others of like
faith; and to change one's religious identity-all without hindrance,
molestation, or discrimination.
21. According to Marci A. Hamilton, it is "intelligent" to acknowledge
that a definitive answer to this question is impossible, although every
contribution and deliberation on the topic aids in the progress towards an
answer. See Marci A. Hamilton, Slouching Toward Globalization: Charting the
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that scholars have recommended the following "essential rights
and liberties" as the minimum standards of religious freedom:
[L]iberty of conscience and non-discrimination on
grounds of faith; free exercise of religion; accommodation
of pluralism in the sense of confessional and institutional
diversity; equality of all religions before the law; separation
of church and state in order to protect religious bodies
and believers from state interference in their internal
affairs and private religious lives (respectively); and dises-
tablishment of religion, foreclosing government from sin-
gling out any particular religion for preferential
treatment.
22
B. Current Global Status of Religious Human Rights
Despite what appears to be near-universal expression of
commitment to religious human rights, the frequency-and
severity-of religious persecution worldwide is staggering.23
Although it is impossible to determine with certainty the exact
numbers of people persecuted for their faith or religious affilia-
tion, it is unquestioned that "violations of freedom of religion
and belief, including acts of severe persecution, occur with fear-
ful frequency."
2 4
Religious freedom is violated in a myriad of ways. A recent
report by the U.S. State Department's Advisory Committee on
Religious Freedom Abroad enumerated the most common kinds
Pitfalls in the Drive to Internationalize Religious Human Rights, 46 EMORY L.J. 307
(1997).
22. van der Vyver, supra note 15, at xi, xlv (summarizing
recommendations made in John Witte, Jr. & Christy Green, The American
Constitutional Experiment in Religious Human Rights: The Perennial Search for
Principles, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at 497).
23. "[F] reedom of religion remains the most persistently violated human
right in the annals of the species. Indeed, religious intolerance has generated
more wars, misery and suffering than any other type of discrimination or bias."
Colter, supra note 7, at 236 (citation omitted). Indeed, it is ironic to note:
[T]he very century that has witnessed the emergence of religious
liberty and religious human rights as norms in international law and
virtually universally recognized in principle has been the very century
in which religious rights and religious liberty have [been] repeatedly
and flagrantly violated on a wholesale scale throughout most of the
world.
Wood, supra note 10, at 481.
24. ACRFA REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 8. "There is
a wealth of evidence to indicate that intolerance and discrimination based on
religion or belief subsists in the contemporary world, and indeed that in some
areas prejudice and bigotry have given rise to outright hatred, persecution and
repression." BENrrO, supra note 11, at para. 45.
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of violations of religious freedom in the last decade, including
the following: physical attacks, including torture and extra-judi-
cial killings; detention or imprisonment; restrictions on freedom
of expression; forced exile; destruction of places of worship; lim-
its on religious publications; and prohibitions on membership,
worship, or religiously mandated observances.
25
The persecution of Christians specifically has gained recent
public attention.26 It is currently estimated that between 200 and
250 million Christians are actively persecuted for their faith,2 7
while a further 400 million live under "non-trivial restrictions" on
their religious liberty.28 Specific reports of persecution of Chris-
tians come from a variety of sources, including mission boards,
churches, individuals, government officials, and secular human
rights organizations. These accounts vary in degree and circum-
stances, and include, but are not limited to, the following acts of
persecution: kidnappings and slavery resulting in forced conver-
sions;29 arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, torture, and
"reform-through-education" of clergy and church members;" °
prohibitions against proselytization; 1 punishment of converts,
25. See ACRFA REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 10-11.
For a detailed description of religious persecution in specific countries, as well
as the action taken by the U.S. Government in response to the persecution, see
BuREAu OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. STATE DEP'T,
UNITED STATES POLICIES IN SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: Focus ON
CHRISTIANS 9-54 (July 22, 1997) <http://www.state.gov/www/human_rights>
[hereinafter U.S. STATE DEP'T, FOCUS ON CHRISTIANS].
26. For a comprehensive catalogue of present-day persecution of
Christian believers, see generally MARSHALL, supra note 12; NINA SHAE, IN THE
LION'S DEN (1997); U.S. STATE DEP'T, Focus ON CHRISTIANS, supra note 25.
27. See MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 253. Marshall defines "persecution"
as "the denial of any of the rights of religious freedom," such as situations
where people are systematically imprisoned for their faith. Id. at 248-49.
28. See id. at 253. Marshall defines "non-trivial restrictions" as harassment,
where people "suffer from legal impediments and are interfered with by the
authorities or others, and face arbitrary arrest and possible physical assault," id.
at 249, or discrimination, "where people may have basic freedom of worship and
other forms of religious freedom, but where the law places them at a consistent
civil and economic disadvantage for exercising such freedoms," id.
29. See, e.g., SHAE, supra note 26, at 31 (regarding Sudan); U.S. STATE
DEP'T, Focus ON CHRISTIANS, supra note 25, at 48 (regarding Sudan).
30. See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 75-80 (regarding China); U.S.
STATE DEP'T, FOCUS ON CHRISTIANS, supra note 25, at 18 (regarding China).
31. See, e.g., U.S. STATE DEP'T, FOCUS ON CHRISTIANS, supra note 25, at 14
(regarding Bhutan); id. at 15 (regarding Brunei); id. at 19 (regarding China);
id. at 31 (regarding Iran); id. at 35 (regarding Kuwait); id. at 41 (regarding
Nepal); id. at 42 (regarding Pakistan); id. at 49 (regarding Tunisia); id. at 51
(regarding United Arab Emirates); id. at 52 (regarding Uzbekistan).
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including arrest, torture, and the death penalty;32 and compul-
sory registration and regulatory control of churches and religious
groups.3 3 In addition to these "severe" means of overt discrimi-
nation against Christians, reports of more subtle and indirect
persecution likewise abound. 4
Considering current awareness of the frequency of religious
persecution and the "openness" with which such persecution is
conducted, why does it continue unabated? Perhaps the inability
to adequately address the issue is due, in part, to the fact that "no
topic has divided mankind more."35 The root causes of religious
intolerance and persecution 6 are perpetual and pervasive: "igno-
rance and lack of understanding, conflicts in religiosity, exploita-
tion or abuse of religion or belief for questionable ends,
developments of history, social tensions, government bureau-
cracy and the absence of dialogue between those holding differ-
ent religions or beliefs."37
Despite the prevalence of religious persecution, religious
human rights have been neglected; secular society and the tradi-
tional human rights community typically emphasize instead the
"more tangible encroachments on human dignity, such as tor-
32. See, e.g., SHAu, supra note 26, at 44 (regarding Egypt); id. at 40
(regarding Saudi Arabia); id. at 35 (regarding Sudan).
33. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 12, at 80-84 (regarding China); U.S.
STATE DEP'T, Focus ON CHRISTIANS, supra note 25, at 44 (regarding Russian
Federation); id. at 46 (regarding Singapore); id. at 48 (regarding Syria); id. at
52 (regarding Vietnam).
34. As described by Pope John Paul II:
Today, besides prison, concentration camps, forced labour camps
and expulsion from one's country, there are other punishments less
well known but more subtle: not violent death, but a kind of civil
death; not only isolation in prisons or in camps, but social
discrimination or permanent restriction of personal liberty. There are
today hundreds and thousands of witnesses to the faith, all too often
ignored or forgotten by public opinion, whose attention is drawn
elsewhere. They are often known to God alone. They suffer daily
hardships, in various parts of every continent.
BENITO, supra note 11, at para. 158 (quoting Pope John Paul II, discourse given
at Lourdes, 4 August 1983, Working Paper submitted to the seminar by the
Holy See (HR/GENEVA/1984/WP.4, p.5)).
35. Natan Lerner, Religious Human Rights Under the United Nations, in
LEGAL PERSPEcTIvEs, supra note 8, at 80, 100 (citation omitted).
36. See generally, Durham, supra note 9, at 1, 3-7 (analogizing these root
causes-the cultural and religious divides that contribute to religious
persecution-to "vast tectonic plates beneath the surface of the earth that
account for continental drift and that cause earthquakes where they collide."
Id. at 4).
37. BENrro, supra note 11, at para. 164 (summarizing what appear to be
"among the most important root causes of intolerance and discrimination in
the matter of religion and belief').
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ture, disappearances, and the like."38 And yet, as awareness of
religious persecution grows, "[r]eligious human rights deserve
more than to remain a neglected chapter in the universal
endeavors to ensure observance of and respect for human
rights. ,
39
III. RELIGIOUS ADVOCATES AND THE SECULAR HuMAN
RIGHTS COMMUNITY
What is required to successfully confront the enigmatic
problem of religious persecution, "is a notion of religious free-
dom that can be shown to be grounded as a shared value within
[all] religious and secular traditions. But achieving any kind of
consensus in this area . . . remains a remarkably difficult
endeavor."4 ° Who then will best succeed in this effort? At first
glance, cooperation between traditional (i.e., secular) interna-
tional human rights organizations and religious advocates
appears to be a natural, necessary, and perhaps inevitable occur-
rence. Both sides have much to offer. and both have made signif-
icant inroads in this field. Any coalition formed between the two
groups most certainly could be mutually beneficial and have
greater effect than their respective individual efforts.
To this point in the struggle for religious freedom, however,
there has been little collaboration between the two sectors.
Rather, the relationship appears to be non-existent, at best, or
strained and counterproductive, at worst. In order to encourage
cooperation, it is important, first, to explore the reasons for this
tension. It is likewise helpful to recognize what both sides have
to offer, in terms of their respective strengths and successes, both
38. Durham, supra note 9, at 1; see also, James Finn, The Cultivation and
Protection of Religious Human Rights, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at 163.
Describing the lack of attention paid to religious freedom, Finn states:
Even those who assert that religious freedom is, in philosophical
and religious terms, the first freedom must acknowledge that one
would not know that on the basis of the public attention given to
religious rights compared to that given a number of other human
rights. In the world of human rights theorists, activists, and advocates
most attention is given to violations based on race, gender, and class;
on national, ethnic, and linguistic groupings.
Id.
39. Lerner, supra note 35, at 134. As one author states: "It is time for us
to take religious rights seriously-to shake off our political indifference and
parochial self-interest and to address the plight and protection of people of all
faiths." John Witte, Jr., Introduction, in RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at
xviii.
40. Durham, supra note 9, at 7.
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to each other and to the religious human rights endeavor as a
whole.
A. Fundamental Differences
One reason for the lack of collaboration between the "secu-
lar" and the "religious" groups may be the obvious differences in
foundational framework and mandate.41 Generally speaking,
traditional secular human rights organizations actively promote a
broad range of international human rights norms, using a variety
of well-developed techniques. Although these organizations vary
widely in size, scope, methodology, and regional or national affil-
iation, they share a common desire to protect human rights, put-
ting aside potentially divisive racial, political, economic, or
religious allegiance or identification.42 "While individual mem-
bers of these organizations may be deeply religious or spiritual,
most often such organizations offer mission statements that
reflect a secular moral purpose encompassing a vision of human
and social cooperation-with strict neutrality as to religion or
belief." 3
Consistent with this secular foundation, human rights orga-
nizations historically have tended to explicitly dismiss religious
freedom as outside their mandate,44 to deprecate religious rights
in favor of other human rights,45 or to consider religious free-
41. The description of "secular" and "religious" human rights
organizations for the purposes of this article is based on generalizations related
to the field of religious human rights, and may or may not be applicable in
other contexts.
42. See Michael Roan, The Role of Secular Non-Governmental Organizations in
the Cultivation and Understanding of Religious Human Rights, in LEGAL
PERSPECTVES, supra note 8, at 135, 147.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 158. Inattention to religious human rights stands in
contradiction to the fact that "most, if not all, secular human rights
[organizations] base their mandates on the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights-which includes the right to freedom of religion or belief .... " Id. at
157-58.
45. In their defense, much of this deprecation by traditional human
rights organizations has not been a result of "calculated agnosticism or callous
apathy," but rather,
[r]ights leaders were often forced, by reason of political pressure or
limited resources, to address the most glaring rights violations and
abuses. Physical abuses-torture, rape, war crimes, false
imprisonment, forced poverty-are easier to track and treat than
spiritual abuses, and often demand more immediate attention.
Witte, supra note 39, at xxxii. Consider, as well, the fact that most human rights
organizations are overcommitted, suffer from under-funding, and that "there
are more than enough other human rights violations in the world to fill their
time." MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 203.
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dom merely a subset of a category of more consequence-the
freedom of thought, conscience, or belief. These tendencies
have a two-fold effect: first, many instances of religious persecu-
tion are neither documented nor reported; second, if religious
persecution is investigated, the uniquely religious motivation or
nature of the persecution is commonly disregarded.46 As a
result, although instances of persecution of Christians and other
religious individuals may be reported or considered, the magni-
tude or extent of religious persecution world-wide is underesti-
mated and difficult to prove statistically.
Primary responsibility for the documentation and promo-
tion of religious human rights is thus left to the efforts of reli-
gious organizations and individuals that call for greater
protection against religious persecution worldwide. It is impossi-
ble to consider these advocates as a unified whole, as they vary in
religious affiliation, ideology, and political perspective. The
common denominator, however, is a distinctly religious motiva-
tion in seeking to promote religious human rights.47 Currently,
the most vocal or visible of the religious advocates in North
America tend to speak out in support of the persecuted Christian
church specifically, although not exclusively. They assert that
worldwide persecution of the Christian community has been
under-reported, and that through their present efforts to
increase awareness of persecuted Christians, freedom for all reli-
gions is fostered.
B. Presumptions and Misconceptions
In addition to the fundamental differences described above,
tension between secular and religious human rights organiza-
tions may be attributed to presumptions or misconceptions
which arise as a result of these differences. The presumptions
made by the secular about the religious, and by the religious
about the secular, result in alienation and lack of collaboration.
Consider first the traditional human rights community. In
light of its secular, religiously neutral foundation, this commu-
nity looks with distrust at the belief, held by most religious orga-
nizations, in moral absolutes and ultimate truth. Furthermore,
46. See MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 203. This disregard may take one of
two forms: (1) victims of religious persecution will often be categorized by
gender, profession, ethnic origin, or other neutral category, but rarely as
Christian or "religious"; (2) overtly religious oppression or persecution may be
described as ethnic or territorial conflict with little attention given to the
religious dimensions of the repression. See id. at 203-05.
47. For discussion of the uniquely Christian justification for religious
human rights, see infra Part IV.
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for a secular community established upon liberalism's ideal of
autonomous choice, the religious view that faith is not a volun-
tary choice is both foreign and threatening. In addition, past
intolerance on the part of many religions makes it difficult for
the human rights community to accept the religious advocates'
assertion that they seek religious freedom for all religions.
Finally, also based on the historical position of many religions,
human rights organizations assume that consensus on the issue
of women's rights, especially reproductive rights, is impossible.
These and other presumptions prevent the human rights com-
munity from entering into meaningful dialogue with religious
organizations.
The traditional human rights community is not alone in the
error of presumption. Religious organizations-or perhaps
more accurately, "conservative" religious organizations-appear
unable to escape the classic yet antiquated "left/right" characteri-
zation of the human rights struggle. This vestige of the Cold War
mentality carries with it much of the hostility and distrust preva-
lent in that era. As a result, some sectors of the religious commu-
nity mistrust the "strong secular and humanistic thrust of the
international human rights community," " and thus choose not
to identify with or participate in the human rights movement as a
whole.
The presumptions and misconceptions for which both sec-
tors are worthy of blame prevent meaningful dialogue and col-
laborative effort concerning religious human rights. Should this
be a cause for concern? This result is only problematic if dia-
logue and collaboration would indeed help further the cause of
religious freedom. It is to this issue that I now turn.
C. Achievements and Offerings
Putting the tensions and problems to one side, a pragmatic
inquiry into the relationship between the two communities
involves the question of what each side brings to the fight against
religious persecution-what have they accomplished and what
do they have to offer? The most obvious contribution from the
traditional human rights organizations is depth of experience.
They offer the strength of their monitoring mechanisms, their
48. Michael K. Young, Religious Liberties and Religious Tolerance: An Agenda
for the Future, 1996 BYU L. REv. 973, 983 (1996). Young draws the analogy that
in the same way the religious community, and particularly evangelical
Christians in the United States, often mistrust the motives of the American Civil
Liberties Union, so "believers are often skeptical about the real aims of the
international human rights norms." Id.
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visibility and voice, their means of influence, and their valuable
experience in international advocacy. The concern remains
whether they are willing to apply these precious resources specifi-
cally to the field of religious human rights.49
In addition to this wealth of "functional" or experiential
assistance, the traditional human rights community offers to the
religious community an important lesson described by Charles
Taylor as "unity-across-difference" 5 -that is, an unconditional
affirmation of universal human rights, not dependent on catego-
rization such as gender, culture, or religion."1 Taylor accurately
attributes to Christianity a rich history of Gospel-inspired acts of
conscience in response to injustice and suffering, a sentiment
later integrated into both secular and political culture.5 2 And
yet, in Taylor's opinion, the fullness of the rights culture couldn't
be realized under Christendom because Christianity was incapa-
ble of radical unconditionality-unable to accept, for example,
"full equality of rights for atheists, or people of a quite alien reli-
gion, or those who violate what seems to be the Christian moral
code."53
49. That is not to say that the secular human rights community has done
nothing to advance the cause of religious human rights. On the contrary, as
early as 1945, non-government organizations worked to create United Nations
human rights norms regarding the recognition and protection of the freedom
of religion or belief. See Roan, supra note 42, at 135. In addition, human rights
organizations often provide information concerning religious persecution; this
information, however, is commonly gathered while monitoring human rights
generally. Reports focussing specifically on religious freedom, such as Amnesty
International's 1993 report on religious intolerance in Saudi Arabia, are "a
rather rare document for a secular NGO." Id. at 151 (referring to AMNESTr
INT'L, SAUDI ARABIA: RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE, THE ARREST, DETENTION, AND
TORTURE OF CHRISTIAN WORSHIPPERS AND SHI'A MUSLIMS (1993)). Prior to this
report, publications by Amnesty International rarely focused on the right to
freedom of religion or belief, and violations of a religious nature were more
frequently noted in one or two pages of a 200-page report. See id.
50. Charles Taylor, A Catholic Modernity? 8, Address at Marianist Award
Lecture (Jan. 25, 1996) (Transcript available from the Office of the President,
University of Dayton, Ohio).
51. See id..at 11.
52. See id. at 23 (imputing to Christianity a "habit of mobilizing for the
redress of injustice and the relief of suffering world-wide").
53. Id. at 11. Taylor hastens to clarify that this failure was not due to
narrow bigotry or zealous intolerance, "as many militant unbelievers say," id.,
but rather to the unsuccessful "project of Christendom: the attempt to marry
the faith with a form of culture and a mode of society," id. at 11-12. This
project, in Taylor's opinion, was doomed to failure, because human society
inevitably involves elements dangerous for religion: coercion, pressure of
conformity, and the sacrifice of high ideals for narrow interests. See id. at 12.
Taylor also emphasizes that Christendom is not alone in this weakness, but that
"the attempt to put some secular philosophy in the place of the faith-
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Thus, the religious community must learn from what it "got
wrong" and what the traditional human rights community "got
right." By way of illustration, it is sometimes true that a parent
must learn from his child a lesson that is simply an extension of
or improvement upon what the parent originally taught the
child. Similarly, it is necessary for the religious community to
recognize, with humility, past failures and to learn anew how to
exercise, unconditionally and universally, compassion and con-
science in the face of injustice and human suffering.
In the same way that the pursuit of religious human rights
can benefit from the contributions of the secular community, the
religious community has much to offer the enterprise of religious
human rights. The recent attention given to the plight of the
persecuted Christian church is just one example of the ability of
religious organizations to promote dialogue among various sec-
tors of society which traditionally are either not aware of or con-
cerned about human rights issues.54 Within the United States,
the increase in awareness and promotion of religious human
rights has resulted in various responses, including the establish-
ment of the Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom
Abroad; 5 the proposed Freedom from Religious Persecution
Jacobinism, Marxism-has scarcely led to better results (and in some cases,
spectacularly worse)." Id.
54. Human rights organizations should draw on the strength of the local-
level communication, commitment, and infrastructure that already exists and is
active in religious communities. As stated by the Advisory Committee on
Religious Freedom Abroad:
Religious groups, across the spectrum, offer various forms of
involvement in combating violations and promoting religious
freedom and other universal human rights. As institutional
organizations-whether large, trans-denominational entities, or small,
local churches, synagogues, mosques, or temples-they each play a
crucial role in highlighting the issue .... Many religious groups are
conducting important work to assist victims of religious persecution
and other human rights violations, monitor and report on human
rights violations, educate and defend universal human rights,
including the right to religious freedom, mediate conflicts, and
promote reconciliation.
See, ACRFA REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 34.
55. The Committee was formed in November 1996, with the following
mandate: "To serve the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary for the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, in an advisory capacity with
respect to significant issues of religious freedom, intolerance, and
reconciliation abroad as agreed upon by the Committee and the Department of
State." See ACRFA REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 4. Within
this purpose, the broad tasks assigned to the Committee are the following:
[T]o call attention to problems of religious persecution and other
violations of religious freedom, and religious intolerance abroad and
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Act;56 a joint Statement of Conscience and Call to Action, put forward
by the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) ;57 and the U.S.
State Department report, United States Policies in Support of Reli-
gious Freedom: Focus on Christians.5"
Beyond the specific accomplishments of religious organiza-
tions, religion itself has a significant impact on the field of
human rights in three ways. First, given that religion touches all
aspects of humanity, an understanding of religion is essential to
any attempt to understand the global community. Certainly,
"[a] ny articulation of human rights that does not pay adequate
attention to the religious issues that make up the life experience
and value systems of so many people in the world necessarily
rings very hollow and has little chance of achieving even modest
acceptance, much less widespread compliance."5 9
Second, specific to religious human rights, the tenets of
every major world religion contain "explicit teachings of toler-
ance and condemnation of religious coercion and disrespect for
religious views other than one's own."60 Furthermore, "[a] n apo-
logia for religious human rights is not only to be found in the
sacred writings of the major religions of the world, but is also
advise on how to end them; and to provide information on how to
bring about reconciliation in areas of conflict, especially conflicts
where religion is a factor, and promote respect for human rights, so
that religious freedom can be fully enjoyed.
Id. at 4-5. In 1998, this Committee released its first INTERIM REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. See generally,
ACRFA REPORT ON REtUGIOUs FREEDOM, supra note 15.
56. This proposed Act was introduced in 1997, see Freedom from
Religious Persecution Act of 1997, H.R. 2431, 143d Cong. (1997), and in 1998,
see Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 1998, H.R. 2431, 144th Cong.
(1998) (also referred to as the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998).
57. In its Statement of Conscience and Call to Action, the NAE called for
specific reforms by the United States government to fight religious persecution,
and also pledged the following:
To end our own silence in the face of suffering of all those
persecuted for their religious faith. To address religious persecution
carried out by our Christian brothers and sisters whenever this occurs
around the world. To withhold assistance by our member
denominations to those countries that fail to take action to end
religious persecution. To do what is within our power to the end that
the government of the United States will take appropriate action to
combat the intolerable religious persecution now victimizing fellow
believers and those of other faiths.
Reprinted in SH.tE, supra note 26, at 101-02.
58. See U.S. STATE DE"T, Focus ON CHRISTIANS, supra note 25.
59. Young, supra note 48, at 982.
60. Wood, supra note 10, at 457.
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directly linked to the nature of religion."6" To effectively accom-
plish the essential task of integrating religious concerns into the
traditional human rights agenda, secular human rights organiza-
tions should turn to the religious advocates for direction and
foundational guidance.
Finally, and most importantly, religion offers a unique and
significant contribution toward the depth of philosophical foun-
dation essential to the protection of human rights. Consider the
following statement by Vaclav Havel:
Politicians at international forums may reiterate a thou-
sand times that the basis of the new world order must be
universal respect for human rights, but it will mean noth-
ing as long as this imperative does not derive from the
respect of the miracle of being, the miracle of the universe,
the miracle of nature, the miracle of our own existence.62
Although the framers of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948 voiced a powerful consensus concerning the dig-
nity of the human person and the rights and freedoms necessary
to protect that dignity,63 they did not, however, "spell out fully
the moral and philosophical reasons undergirding universal
human rights."64 As a result, the promotion of human rights
generally was, and continues to be, vulnerable to attack, confu-
sion, and purposeful distortion. For example, the concept of
universal human rights has been weakened by the following:
inconsistent application, complaints of cultural imperialism or
imposition, emphasis of political rights at the expense of eco-
nomic and social rights, denial of "truth" as indispensable to the
affirmation of human rights, a distorted concept of rights with-
out attendant duties, and the claimed defense of national inter-
est or state sovereignty." In response to these attacks, the time
has come "for giving a fuller account of the human rights pro-
61. Id. at 463.
62. VACLAV HAVEL, OUR QUEST FOR MEANING IN A POST-MODERN WORLD
(July 4, 1994 Speech on Receipt of the Liberty Medal), reprinted in PHILADELPHIA
ENQUIRER, July 6, 1994, at Al 7.
63. "The Declaration marked a decisive moment in the moral, cultural,
and political history of the world. It gave powerful testimony to a widespread
longing for freedom, justice, peace, and solidarity." On Human Rights. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Fifty Years Later: A Statement of the Ramsey
Colloquium, FIRST THINGS, Apr. 1998, at 18, 18 [hereinafter On Human Rights].
64. Id. at 21. "The agreement among nations was tenuous; the conflict
between democratic and totalitarian forms of government was intense. In view
of the circumstances, the measure of moral and philosophical coherence that
was achieved is remarkable." Id.
65. For an excellent description of these and other attacks on the
concept of universal human rights, as well as a comprehensive analysis of how
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ject, for clarifying its scope, strengthening its foundations, and
keeping it on a straight path."6 6
Specific to the field of religious human rights, one author
notes:
Despite an almost universal commitment to religious
human rights . . . there is no universal consensus as to their
intellectual or philosophical basis. While religious human
rights or religious liberty in broad principle have come to
be widely endorsed in both national constitutions and in
international law, there is no universal consensus as to
their rational or philosophical basis. To be sure, there are
important political and practical reasons for arguing the
case for religious rights and religious liberty .... but even
those political or practical reasons need ultimately to be
rooted in some philosophical principles and not depend
primarily, not to mention solely, on political expediency.
67
Without a comprehensive foundation on which to build consen-
sus, endorsement, or action in support of religious human rights,
decisions as to their promotion and protection will be made on
an ad hoc basis, with little predictability and no safeguard against
purely political decisions. In the absence of a conceptual frame-
work, what protects against decisions made according to what is
"politically expedient" or "economically beneficial"? Upon what
criteria or by what standard will decisions be made? The protec-
tion of religious human rights is too weighty a responsibility to
entrust the endeavor to such uncertainty.
For human rights, and specifically religious human rights, to
be universally and consistently protected, an agreed upon coher-
ent philosophical account about what rights must be supported
and why is imperative. The religious justification for human
rights provides what is arguably the most appropriate and defini-
tive foundational framework for the pursuit of religious human
rights.68 The following section describes several elements of this
uniquely religious framework.
biblical principles contribute to the moral and philosophical foundation of
religious human rights, see generally id.
66. Id. at 21-22.
67. Wood, supra note 10, at 456 (emphasis added).
68. This is due, in part, to the fact that the majority of people around the
world espouse some degree of what may be considered religious belief.
Considering the sheer numbers of people of faith around the world, one
author writes:
[I]t is [not] understandable how the United Nations could
become so trapped in its secular discourse that it would persist in its
refusal to deal with the fact that for millions of human beings whose
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IV. THE CHRISTIAN JUSTIFICATION FOR SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS
The deep roots of human rights ideals are rooted nowhere else than
in the biblical tradition, for it is here that we find the decisive
unveiling of a perspective in which moral first principles demand-
ing the respect for the neighbor are made known to humanity by a
reality that is universal and absolute. . . . This [reality] is an
ethical God, the source and norm of a kind of justice and right-
eousness and contends against what we often find as we look
around the world.
Max L. Stackhouse & Stephen E. Healey 69
On a very personal level, my faith and religious convictions
are the motivation and justification for my support of religious
human rights. I consider it my duty as a Christian to oppose
injustice and fight oppression.7 ° Beyond my personal motiva-
tion, however, I also believe that the very concept of human
rights originated in religious belief. For me, as "If] or many reli-
gious persons, certainly, the idea of human rights simply does
not make sense, it does not exert a claim, apart from, cut off
from, the Gospel vision of the world and of our place in it-or
from some equivalent religious vision."7 1
What, then, do I consider to be the uniquely Christian (or
religious) justification for the support of religious human rights?
First, all human life is sacred, created by God. Second, the right
to religious freedom is a God-given right, rooted in the sanctity
of life. Third, by its very nature, religion is a voluntary act; true
faith cannot be coerced. Fourth, religious freedom allows for
and facilitates the pursuit of ultimate truth. Finally, Christianity's
own moral principles demand a response of respect for human
rights.
lives are rooted in belief rather than unbelief, human rights become
meaningful only when they are placed within the framework of their
belief system.
Riffat Hassan, Rights of Women Within Islamic Communities, in RELIGIOUS PERSPEC-
TIVES, supra note 7, at 361, 365-66.
69. Max L. Stackhouse & Stephen E. Healey, Religion and Human Rights: A
Theological Apologetic, in RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 485, 492.
70. See Desmond Tutu, Preface to REuGious PERSPEcIVS, supra note 7, at
ix. "Any person of faith has no real option. In the face of injustice and
oppression it is to disobey God not to stand up in opposition to that injustice
and that oppression." Id. at xi.
71. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA Or HuMAN RiGHrs 39-40 (1998)
[hereinafter PERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS].
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A. Sanctity of Human Life-the "Ethic of Dignity"
The foundation of all human rights is the inherent dignity
of the human person, as expressly stated in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, 72 the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 73 and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights.74 The reliance of human
rights documents on the principle of inherent human dignity has
been described in the following way:
The idea of human rights that informs these various inter-
national human rights documents (and many others) is,
then, in part, the idea that there is something about each
and every human being, simply as a human being, such
that certain choices should be made and certain other
choices rejected; in particular, certain things ought not to
be done to any human being and certain other things
ought to be done for every human being.
75
This view that our actions toward one another should be gov-
erned by an understanding of the inherent dignity of each indi-
vidual has been described as an "ethic of dignity."76 Under this
principle, in response to the dignity of each human person, "we
should not just respect such a person but ... we should have a
deep reverence for that person."
77
Yet to believe in the inherent dignity of the human person,
it is foundationally necessary to believe in God. 78 The ethic of
dignity is fundamentally linked to, and indeed finds its origins in,
72. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), reprinted in BASic
DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 21.
The Universal Declaration is clear: it acknowledges the rights
which it proclaims but does not confer them, since they are inherent
in the human person and in human dignity. Consequently, no one
can legitimately deprive another person, whoever they may be, of
these rights, since this would do violence to their nature. All human
beings, without exception, are equal in dignity.
POPE JOHN PAUL II, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: THE SECRET OF TRUE PEACE
(Jan. 1, 1999) (Message of His Holiness for the XXXII World Day of Peace)
[hereinafter POPE JOHN PAUL II, XXXII WORLD DAY OF PEACE].
73. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1967), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 125.
74. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1967), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 114.
75. PERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 71, at 12.
76. See Wolfgang Huber, Human Rights and Biblical Legal Thought, in
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 47, 55.
77. Tutu, supra note 70, at x.
78. As stated by R.H. Tawney: "The essence of all morality is this: to
believe that every human being is of infinite importance, and therefore that no
consideration of expediency can justify the oppression of one by another. But
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the Judeo-Christian view that human life is sacred 7 9 -that life is a
gift from God, that we were created by Him, and furthermore,
that we were created in His image."0 "Human dignity is not
dependent on the disposition of other humans, nor on the pow-
ers of society or the state. The human person in his or her lim-
ited time is granted an unending dignity that is not product of
human efforts but rather a pure, unearned gift of God."8 1
Outside of this religious justification, it is difficult if not
impossible to convincingly articulate a rationale in support of the
concept of the dignity and sanctity of the human person.8 2 And
yet, "[t]o suggest that the idea of human rights is ineliminably
religious . .. is not to deny that one can take human rights very
seriously indeed without being religious."83 Those who do not
believe in God or do not espouse to a religious world view under-
standably claim that for them, the sanctity of human life is not
ineliminably religious, but rather, that theirs simply is a deeply
held moral or philosophical belief.84
Religious persons are not alone, however, in their belief that
the concept of human dignity is ineliminably religious. One sec-
ular author, who insists that for him, it is "very difficult-perhaps
impossible-to embrace religious convictions," nevertheless
claims that "the liberal theory of rights requires a doctrine of
human dignity, preciousness and sacredness that cannot be
utterly detached from a belief in God or at least from a world
to believe this it is necessary to believe in God." J.M. WINTER & D.M. JOSLIN,
R.H. TAWNEY'S COMMONPLAcE BOOK 67 (1972).
79. See generally, Huber, supra note 76 (discussing the origins of the "ethic
of dignity").
80. See Genesis 1:26, 27.
81. Huber, supra note 76, at 55.
82. As Michael J. Perry has concluded: "There is no intelligible (much
less persuasive) secular version of the conviction that every human being is
sacred; the only intelligible versions are religious." PERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 71, at 11.
83. Id. at 35.
84. See Ronald Dworkin, Life is Sacred: That's the Easy Part, NEw YORK TIMES
MAG., May 16, 1993, at 36 ("We almost all accept . .. that human life in all its
forms is sacred .... For some of us, this is a matter of religious faith; for others,
of secular but deep philosophical belief."); cf. PERRY, HuMAN RIGHTs, supra note
71, at 37 (explaining that secularists will respond as follows: "The conviction
that every human being is sacred cannot be inescapably religious, for if it were,
how could we-we who are not religious, and who may even look at religion as
always and everywhere little more than a childish superstition-defend the idea
of human rights?").
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view that would be properly considered religious in some meta-
physically profound sense." 5 The same author concedes:
[T]he idea that fundamental moral values may require
[religious] convictions is not one to be welcomed with joy
[by nonreligious enthusiasts of the liberal theory of rights].
This idea generates tensions and appears to force choices
that some of us would prefer not to make. But it still might
be true for all of that.86
In conclusion, therefore, both religious and secular theorists
agree that the concept of the dignity and sanctity of the human
person finds its origins in religion and is most defensible
through religious justification.
B. Religious Human Rights are God-Granted
Following the premise that the inherent dignity of the
human person originates from our creation by God, the logical
conclusion is that God likewise created (or more accurately, con-
ferred) all human rights.87 To comprehend fully the magnitude
of this statement, consider first that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights did not confer human rights on humanity.
The Declaration merely acknowledged the existence of the rights
enumerated in its text, "since they are inherent in the human
person and in human dignity."8" All rights "have their source
85. Jeffrie Murphy, Afterword: Constitutionalism, Moral Skepticism, and
Religious Belief in CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION 239, 248
(Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1988), quoted in PERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 71,
at 41.
86. Id., quoted in PERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 71, at 41 (emphasis
and edits in original).
87. See On Human Rights, supra note 63, at 20 ("All human beings are
endowed with basic rights by God, in whose image they are created. These
rights and their corresponding obligations are indispensable aspects of the
universal moral law."); cf. POPE JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS: ENCYCLICAL OF
POPE JOHN XXIII ON ESTABLISHING UNIVERSAL PEACE IN TRUTH, JUSTICE,
CHARITY, AND LIBERTY (1963) ("When the promotion of the dignity of the
person is the guiding principle, and when the search for the common good is
the overriding commitment, then solid and lasting foundations for building
peace are laid.").
88. POPE JOHN PAUL II, XXXII WORLD DAY OF PEACE, supra note 72.
The Universal Declaration is clear: it acknowledges the rights
which it proclaims but does not confer them, since they are inherent
in the human person and in human dignity. Consequently, no one
can legitimately deprive another person, whoever they may be, of
these rights, since this would do violence to their nature. All human
beings, without exception, are equal in dignity.
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in the transcendent dignity of the human person created by
God."89
The inherent dignity of the human person, therefore, is the
cornerstone for all human rights generally, and for religious
human rights specifically. As stated by the Catholic Church, in
the 1965 Declaration on Religious Liberty:
This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a
right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all
men are to be immune from coercion on the part of indi-
viduals or of social groups and of any human power ....
[T]he right to religious freedom has its foundation in the
very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known
through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.90
Furthermore, religious freedom is not merely one of a number
of rights bestowed upon humanity by our Creator; it is the cor-
nerstone of other human rights. "Because religion most directly
addresses the foundation of human dignity, religious freedom is
the source and safeguard of all rights and freedoms."91
89. Documentation: Christianity and Democracy, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1996, at
30, 33 [hereinafter Christianity and Democracy].
90. Declaration on Religious Liberty, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 681
(1996) [hereinafter Declaration on Religious Liberty].
91. On Human Rights, supra note 63, at 19. As stated by Pope John Paul II:
The importance of religious freedom leads me to stress once
more that the right to religious freedom is not merely one human
right among many others; rather, it is the most fundamental, since the
dignity of every person has its first source in his essential relationship
with God the Creator and Father, in whose image and likeness he was
created, since he is endowed with intelligence and freedom.
POPE JOHN PAUL II, IF You WANr PEACE, RESPECT THE CONSCIENCE OF EvERY
PERSON (Jan. 1, 1991) (Message of His Holiness for the XXIV World Day of
Peace) (internal quotations omitted) [hereinafter POPE JOHN PAUL II, XXIV
WORLD DAY OF PEACE].
Although beyond the scope of this Note, scholars have commented on the
relationship between religious human rights specifically and the more general
field of human rights. Not only are religious human rights considered the "cor-
nerstone" to all human rights, but many of the justifications or rationales in
support of religious human rights likewise support human rights generally. See
generally Martin E. Marty, Religious Dimensions of Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS PER-
SPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 1, 3 ("Protect religious beliefs, exercises and organi-
zations... and you are likely to be extending other rights further."); MichaelJ.
Perry, The Idea of Human Rights: Is the Idea of Human Rights Ineliminably Religious?,
in PROBLEMS AND CoNFLICTS BETWEEN LAW AND MORALIrY IN A FREE SOCIETY 79
(James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1994) ("If the conviction that every
human being is sacred is inescapably religious, it follows that the idea of human
rights is ineliminably religious, because the conviction is an essential, even
foundational, constituent of the idea."); Wood, supra note 10, at 455 (stating
that religious human rights "lie at the heart of the struggle for human rights
around the world and involve the very sanctity of the human person. An apolo-
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C. Voluntariness of Religion
The third uniquely religious argument for religious human
rights moves from the discussion of what God has granted, to a
defense of religious freedom based upon the very nature of reli-
gious faith itself. To be sincere and legitimate, religious faith
cannot be coerced-it must be both voluntary and personal.
92
Intolerance, therefore, is "religion's worst adversary."93 Without
the promotion of religious human rights and religious freedom,
authentic religion itself is in peril. This justification is uniquely
religious, resting squarely "on a religious idea about our relations
with God."94
From the Christian perspective, God requires sincere faith.
"No intellectual ingenuity, no organized institution, no kind of
compulsion and no power of persuasion can change the fact that
God deals with men as free and responsible beings and that he
expects from them an uncoerced response."9" As explained in
scripture, "without faith it is impossible to please God, because
anyone who comes to him must believe that he exists and that he
rewards those who earnestly seek him."96
Not only is faith required to please God; without faith, any
religious observance is nothing more than "going through the
motions." Although it is possible to force an individual to per-
form certain rites or rituals, faith itself cannot be forced.97 As
John Locke stated in his Letter Concerning Toleration: "lIT] rue and
saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind,
without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is
the nature of understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the
belief of anything by outward force."98
gia for religious human rights also stands to strengthen the cause of human
rights in general." Id. at 455. Indeed, "basic to all human rights are religious
rights, without the guarantee of which ... all other human rights are in peril."
Id. at 475).
92. "An imposed faith is a contradiction in terms .... [F] aith must be
free if it is not to destroy itself." Augustin Leonard, Freedom of Faith and Civil
Toleration, in TOLERANCE AND THE CATHOLIC 113 (1955).
93. Wood, supra note 10, at 463.
94. Id.
95. A.F. CARRILLO DE ALBORNOZ, THE BASIS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 74
(1963).
96. Hebrews 11:6.
97. In the words of Milton, "to compell outward profession . .. is to
compell hypocrisie, not to advance religion." John Milton, A Treatise of Civil
Power in Ecclesiastical Causes, inJOHN MILTON: SELECTED PROSE 296, 311 (Patrides
ed., 1985)
98. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION 127 (Cough ed., 1946). The Catholic Church has
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D. Pursuit of Truth
The fourth uniquely religious justification for the protection
of religious human rights rests on the realization that the pursuit
of ultimate truth may most effectively, and perhaps only, be
undertaken in a context of religious freedom. This rationale is
most defensibly a religious one, given that it requires a funda-
mental belief in objective truth and in humankind's ability to
pursue that objective truth.
This rationale does not assume that a lack of freedom will
destroy truth. Objective truth-God's truth-cannot be
destroyed; it exists, regardless of one's freedom to pursue it. The
salient question is whether the seeker is afforded the freedom of
inquiry required to pursue the truth, to understand it, and then
to apply it to daily life.
From a Christian perspective, the ultimate source of truth is
God Himself.99 His truth is revealed to the seeker through inspi-
ration and scripture. The believer is assisted in understanding
God's truth through personal revelation enabled by the Holy
Spirit, through fellow believers, and through the church. Of
course, God has the power to reveal His truth to a seeker despite
constraints, even in a situation devoid of religious freedom.1"'
However, the pursuit of truth is best facilitated by freedom of
inquiry and religious freedom.
The seeker, therefore, should be given the opportunity to
inquire, to study, to discuss, and to share his findings with others.
Truth is to be sought after in a manner proper to the dig-
nity of the human person and his social nature. The
inquiry is to be free, carried on with the aid of teaching or
instruction, communication, and dialogue. In the course
of these, men explain to one another the truth they have
discovered, or think they have discovered, in order thus to
assist one another in the quest for truth.10 '
similarly declared: "[O]f its very nature, the exercise of religion consists before
all else in those internal, voluntary, and free acts whereby man sets the course
of his life directly toward God. No merely human power can either command
or prohibit acts of this kind." Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 90, at
681.
99. "The guarantee that objective truth exists is found in God, who is
Absolute Truth; objectively speaking, the search for truth and the search for
God are one and the same." POPE JOHN PAUL II, XXIV WORLD DAY OF PEACE,
supra note 90.
100. "In creating the person, God wrote on the human heart a law which
everyone can discover." Id.
101. Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 90, at 680-81.
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Such freedom of inquiry will have a two-fold effect: First, this
freedom will allow truth to prevail over falsehood. Second, on a
more personal level, these exercises will permit the seeker to take
a step closer to fully comprehending the truth, understanding its
application, and integrating it into daily life.
E. Living by Christianity's Moral Standard1 °2
The moral principles of Christianity command us l0 3 to love
and serve, not to judge or condemn-this is what it means to be
a "Christian," to be "like Christ." To be consistent with the teach-
ings of Christianity, therefore, a believer should try, as far as
humanly possible, to love and serve all fellow human beings. The
promotion and protection of the human rights of all individuals
logically flows from this principle of Christianity.
God commands Christians: "Love one another as I have
loved you,""0 4 and "Love your neighbor as yourself." ' 5 He also
instructs us to love our enemies, 10 6 a task much more difficult
than loving those who love us in return. In addition, Christians
are called to love and serve "the least of these," a term Christ
used to refer to those who are hungry, thirsty, strangers, without
clothing, sick, or in prison.'0 7 The ramifications of our action or
inaction take on greater significance when we realize that God
will consider whatever we do (or do not do) to help those in
need to be something we did (or did not do) for Him.'
In what is commonly referred to as the "Golden Rule,"
Christ instructed His followers to "do to others as you would have
them do to you. '"109 In the same passage, He also commanded:
"Do not judge, and you will not be judged. Do not condemn,
102. The painful reality is that the Christian Church has often not lived
up to its own moral standards in the area of religious tolerance. The same may
be said of most major religions. Despite the errors of the past, however, the
Church can still have a legitimate and influential role in the promotion of
religious human rights. Indeed, "Christianity has over the past three centuries
slowly worked itself to a principled position of religious toleration and
freedom." Luke Timothy Johnson, Religious Rights and Christian Texts, in
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 65, 69.
103. Given my Christian identity, throughout this section I refer to
Christians personally, as "we" or "us."
104. See John 13:34; see also John 15:12, 17.
105. See Leviticus 19:18. Christ answered the question, "Who is my
neighbor," through the Parable of the Good Samaritan. See Luke 10:25-37
(teaching that my "neighbor" is any person I see who is in need of my help).
106. See Luke 6:27-36; see also Matthew 5:43-48.
107. See Matthew 25:3146.
108. See id.
109. Luke 6:31; see also Matthew 25:3146.
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and you will not be condemned."11 ° The commandments to love
and not to judge do not mean that we as Christians must embrace
all religious diversity or pluralism as legitimate "truth." Further-
more, these instructions do not mean that I cannot disagree or
oppose views I consider untruthful or incorrect. As a Christian, I
must still attempt to discern right from wrong. These instruc-
tions do mean, however, that I must not be hypocritical; I must
examine my own life for truthfulness and consistency. More per-
sonally, these instructions mean that my efforts to live by the
moral demands of Christianity serve as a foundation for my
understanding of religious freedom as a fundamental human
right.
To live by the moral demands of Christianity means simply
this: to "give urgent priority to all who are in need, especially the
poor, the oppressed, the despised, and the marginal."' Chris-
tians, therefore, must support human rights, not because the
state (or the international community) requires us to, but
because as God's representatives on this earth, we are "witnessing
to the transcendent dignity of the human person .... Therefore,
the witness of the churches should reflect an unwavering adher-
ence to a single standard in the judgment of human rights." 2
V. RELIGIOUS RATIONALE IN THE SECULAR ARENA
[Without the emphasis of religious liberty in a society that is secu-
lar by definition, those who see a religious foundation for the
human rights a secular society such as ours affirms have no entry
into this moral discourse of the public square. The task of religious
believers who wish to enter this moral discourse (although there are
quite afew who regard such entry more dangerous to their religious
integrity than beneficial to it and thus opt for sectarian seclusion)
110. Luke 6:37
111. Christianity and Democracy, supra note 89, at 30. As taught by Pope
John Paul II:
Faith teaches us that every person has been created in the image
and likeness of God. Even when man refuses it, the heavenly Father's
love remains steadfast; his is a love without limits. He sent his Son
Jesus to redeem every individual, restoring each one's full human
dignity. With this in mind, how can we exclude anyone from our care?
Rather, we must recognize Christ in the poorest and the most
marginalized .... As the parable of the rich man, who will remain
forever without a name, and the poor man called Lazarus clearly
shows, in the stark contrast between the insensitive rich man and the
poor in need of everything, God is on the latter's side. We too must
be on this same side.
POPE JOHN PAUL II, XXXII WORLD DAY OF PEACE, supra note 72.
112. Christian and Democracy, supra note 89, at 34.
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is to persuade others that a religious foundation for human rights
can respect the realm of the secular where so many of these rights




Having described my foundational position regarding the
religious justifications for the promotion and protection of reli-
gious human rights, I now return to the pivotal issue of this Note:
What role should this religious rationale play in my efforts of
advocacy in the secular arena? Although it is not possible for me,
as a Christian, not to rely on my religious rationale, must I "secu-
larize" the manner in which I express my views in order to be
effective? Or alternatively, will remaining consistent with my reli-
gious identity enable me to do more to further the cause of reli-
gious human rights in the long-term?
This section considers opposing positions on this issue.
First, I focus on the perception described by David Novak,
above-that is, because of my religious foundation for human
rights, I will be refused entry into the moral discourse of secular
society. As a result of this "secular myopia," I will be either
marginalized or discredited completely. I next describe, how-
ever, why, in theory at least, a full expression of religious ration-
ale and identity should be both expected and welcomed in
secular debate. After considering these two perspectives, I con-
clude that in order to help the cause of religious human rights in
the long-term, I must act without compromise-when I enter the
"public square," I must both retain and reflect the unique reli-
gious rationale upon which my position is founded.
A. The Current Challenge: Forced Secularization of
Religious Rationale
A generation ago, it was taboo to openly discuss sex, politics,
or religion. Today's society has lost its inhibitions regarding sex
or politics; but often, religion is still a subject to be avoided. Per-
haps the potential listener believes religion to be of no conse-
quence. 114 Perhaps he simply has no personal experience with
113. David Novak, Religious Human Rights in Judaic Texts, in RELIGIOUS
PERSPECrVES, supra note 7, at 175, 200.
114. Religion is often considered "like building model airplanes, just
another hobby; something quiet, something private, something trivial."
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
PoLmcs TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 22 (1993). See generally, John
Pickering, Christian Soldier in a Secular City: An Evangelical's Culture Shock, WASH.
POST, May 12, 1996 at CO. Pickering, an evangelical Christian, describes his
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or knowledge of religion, no point of reference from which to
understand its complexities. Or perhaps the explanation is more
insidious-the potential listener discounts the devoted religious
believer as weird, crazy, or even fanatical.' 15
In order to keep the "fanatical religious believer" out of pub-
lic debate, secular society developed the following unwritten
rules of propriety: "Public decisions must be made by arguments
that are public in character. A public argument is transsubjec-
tive. It is not derived from sources of revelation or disposition
that are essentially private and arbitrary."" 6 It follows, therefore,
that the private and subjective nature of religion legitimizes secu-
lar theorists' attempts to privatize religion, to banish it from the
"public square.""? Richard John Neuhaus describes the
dilemma of the religious participant in secular public debate as
follows:
For an event to be legitimately public, it must be secular. If
it is touched by religion, that is to be viewed as a private
and somewhat idiosyncratic factor .... One "happens to
be" religious, but it is not a factor that warrants public con-
sideration. Public consideration of the religious beliefs of
others is an invasion of privacy. The public assertion of
one's own beliefs is an imposition upon carefully sterilized
space." 8
The justification for such rules may be, as mentioned above,
that religion is considered trivial, that it is not understood, or
entrance into the secular realm as follows: "I've found that the more I progress
intellectually and professionally, the more I encounter people-often friends-
who find it a little odd, even threatening, when they discover my religious
identity." Id.
115. According to Stephen Carter, "Our culture seems to take the
position that believing deeply in the tenets of one's faith represents a kind of
mystical irrationality." CARTER, supra note 114, at 6-7. In the words of Rawls:
"To subordinate all our aims to one end . . .still strikes as irrational, or more
likely as mad." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 554 (1971).
116. RICHARDJOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 36 (1984). The
specific context Neuhaus considers is the participation of the "religious new
right" in what he identifies as the "naked public square," a public arena
deliberately void of argument based on morality or religion. Although not
discussed specifically, his perception of secular public discourse is applicable to
the position of the religious human rights advocate.
117. See Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-Stopper, in 3 COMMON
KNOWLEDGE 1, 2 (1994) (Secular theorists consider it "bad taste to bring
religion into discussions of public policy.").
118. NEUHAUS, supra note 116, at 103 (emphasis in original). By this
description, Neuhaus is not articulating what he believes the situation should be;
he is merely describing the current context in which religious persons find
themselves.
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that religious devotees are considered fanatics. An alternative
explanation may originate from the assumption that religious
debate on controversial political issues is divisive, or that the reli-
gious participants are unable to "gain a critical distance on their
religious beliefs-the kind of critical distance essential to truly
deliberative debate." '11 9 Finally, the preclusion of religion may
arise from the sentiment that the "legitimacy" of a public deci-
sion is suspect if that decision is based upon grounds that are not
"publicly accessible.1 20
Whatever the justification, the religious advocate who
attempts "to enter the political arena making public claims on
the basis of private truths" '2 1 is assured that he can expect to be
misunderstood, ignored, marginalized, or discredited for his reli-
ance on something other than "public reason." Thus, although
the religious believer is permitted to rely on his religious convic-
tions in making private decisions, he is not permitted to publicly
express himself in religious terminology.
1 22
What then is the religious believer to do, if he hopes to be
successful and convincing in public debate? He is encouraged to
hide his religious beliefs and argue in nonreligious terminology
119. MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
MORAL PERSPECTIVES 45 (1997) [hereinafter PERRY, RELIGION].
120. For discussions concerning "publicly accessible" grounds, see
generally, JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); Abner S. Greene, The
Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993); Lawrence B.
Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729 (1993).
Cf GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONviCrIONS, supra note 3, at 219 (suggesting that
reliance on religious convictions is not necessarily suspect, but rather, is simply
self-defeating). Greenawalt states: "In a very religious but extremely tolerant
society, public airing of particular religious views might work well, but in
actuality such discourse promotes a sense of separation between the speaker
and those who do not share his religious convictions and is likely to produce
both religious and political divisiveness." Id.
121. NEUHAUS, supra note 116, at 36.
122. See GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVrTONS, supra note 3, at 12
("Though reliance on religious convictions may be appropriate ... argument in
religious terms is often an inapt form of public dialogue."). Illustrating his
contention that "one's complete grounds for action may differ from one's
public justification or advocacy," Greenawalt recounts the following:
I explained my position and advocated it in a manner that made
no use of my religious beliefs, any comprehensive view, or any
nonaccessible ground. I appealed to considerations that I thought
would be taken as relevant by all those with whom I had joint
responsibility for the decision. . . . I understood the difference
between making a directly religious argument and making arguments
that had wider applicability.
KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 137 (1995)
[hereinafter GREENAWALT, PRIvATE CONSCIENCES].
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alone. 12 3 To alleviate any discomfort with this strategy of secur-
ing agreement by what appears to be overt deception, the tactic
is more palatable when considered nothing more than a modest
attempt to find "common ground"-a principle of effective per-
suasion practiced daily by those who seek to influence or
convince.
We do not expect a speaker to reveal all the personal judg-
ments that have led him to his position; we expect him to
put forward considerations that will appeal to others.
Effective argument appeals to grounds that the audience
will accept. If the audience includes many people who do
not share one's religious convictions, the most effective
persuasion will rely on other than narrow religious
arguments.
124
The intent, therefore, is not to deceive or to create a false ration-
ale more convincing or acceptable than the religious rationale
upon which the religious advocate relies. 125 Rather, the advocate
utilizes an effective method of persuasion whereby arguments
123. Not only must the religious believer limit self-expression to a
neutral, non-religious vocabulary; he also must not reveal any trace of a purely
religious motivation or imperative:
Those wishing to avoid charges of improperly bringing religion
into the public square must be careful in the way they characterize
their political goals. Particular positions cannot be presented as
institutionally required or as theologically right. Instead, they must
appeal to more general political or social interests. The advocacy of
positions, in short, must be accomplished without the passion or
vehemence of religious imperative.
William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 861 (1993).
124. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CoNVICI ONS, supra note 3, at 220-21. In his
more recent book, Greenawalt suggests that the decision to rely on more
"accessible" grounds is consistent with a principle of reasonability: "It may be
reasonable, independent of one's own particular views about religion and ethics,
to emphasize the importance in a pluralist society of public discussion in terms
of grounds that are accessible to others." GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES;
supra note 122, at 128 (emphasis in original).
125. Although, generally speaking, deception is not the intended
objective, some theorists may advocate overt deception as a means by which to
achieve fairness for everyone:
The agnostic point of view is a device (like the veil of ignorance)
for securing everyone's agreement. It keeps the contracting parties
ignorant about certain details of their situation so that they are willing
to make concessions. The most important thing to hide from the
parties is information about their goals in life .... If I am ignorant
about my own ends the safe bargain is one that is fair to everybody,
because when the veil is lifted I could be anybody. As you might
expect, the best way to be fair to everybody is to maximize freedom.
That lets each person pursue her own goals.
JOHN GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 55-56 (1996).
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based upon "common ground," while still consistent with relig-
iously held beliefs, will be more easily understood or accepted by
the listener.
By identifying neutral ground in common with his secular
counterparts, the religious believer may succeed in garnering
their support. Indeed, from this perspective, there is little
chance of success without "secularizing" the religious rationale or
objectives.
126
[C]itizens of extremely diverse religious views can build
principles of political order and social justice that do not
depend on particular religious beliefs. The common cur-
rency of political discourse is nonreligious argument about
human welfare. Public discourse about political issues with
those who do not share religious premises should be cast
in other than religious terms.
127
Kent Greenawalt reassures the religious believer that it should
not be difficult to "secularize" religious views, given that "[a]ny
religious morality is likely to include many elements that are
found in secular moralities and that can most plausibly lay claim
to being self-evidently true, universally accepted, or demonstra-
ble on the basis of accessible reasons."
128
In the context of religious human rights, the religious
rationale in support of religious freedom 129 obviously "relies
upon reasons that only some people find convincing."' Given
the current hostility to religion in the "public square," it is not
surprising that the religious advocate feels constrained to "secu-
larize" his views before entering the fray. It is easy to identify
adequate "secular" or neutral grounds, for "everyone has a rea-
son to support some degree of religious freedom."' 3 ' From this
perspective, the task of the religious advocate is to identify and
capitalize upon secular reasons, in order to gather support for
126. In Greenawalt's opinion:
If one is to suggest a principle about reasons for political
decisions that is more than a corollary of religious and ethical views
concerning the validity of methods of reason, then one must present
grounds for the political principle that have appeal to persons of
religious and ethical views different from one's own.... The need for
breadth of appeal is especially great if the principle one invokes
depends on reciprocity of performance.
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 122, at 128.
127. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 216.
128. Id. at 70.
129. For a discussion of what I consider to be the uniquely religious
rationale in support of religious freedom, see supra Part IV.
130. GARVEY, supra note 125, at 54.
131. Id. at 55.
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decisions that will fit within the agendas or objectives of all par-
ticipants in the pursuit of religious human rights.
B. A Viable Alternative: Admission of Religious Rationale
Turning from this discouraging perception of reality, I must
ask a very obvious question: Is it absolutely necessary for the reli-
gious advocate to secularize his views in order to participate in
the public arena? One can imagine a radically different para-
digm, in which the religious advocate for religious human rights
is not only permitted to openly articulate his religious rationale; he
is both expected and encouraged to do So.132
The ideal of a more permissive environment holds a great
deal of theoretical appeal. First, consider the modest claim that
religious believers simply should be allowed to be themselves.
On the one hand, this is merely a matter of practicality: "People
have great difficulty trying to face particular political issues free
of the push of their religious or other comprehensive views."
131
For most religious believers, faith is central to identity. Indeed,
as a Christian I consider my faith integrally woven into the very
fabric of who I am-my faith defines me. From personal experi-
ence, I can attest to how difficult it is to remove that element of
faith from any public discourse or debate in which I am
engaged.1 34 If my very identity inherently arises out of my faith,
what of me remains after my religious rationale is forcibly
removed?
Furthermore, as a matter of fairness, why can secular society
exact from me a suspension of the most significant portion of my
identity as a price of admission into the arena of public
debate?1"5 I am permitted to rely on my religious convictions in
132. Steven Smith states the position of the religious believer, who calls
this alternate paradigm: "The religious citizen supports not two severable
propositions but rather the single, complex proposition that secular and
religious influences must both play a part in public decisions." Steven D. Smith,
Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L.
REv. 955, 1010 (1989).
133. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 122, at 138.
134. In the words of David Novak, if forced to choose between allegiance
to faith and attachment to any temporal or earthly affiliation, "my religious
engagement is existentially prior to my engagement in any polity (the two only
being identical when the Kingdom of God finally comes)." Novak, supra note
113, at 177.
135. "[E]fforts to craft a public square from which religious conversation
is absent ... will always in the end say to the religionists that they alone, unlike
everybody else, must enter public dialogue only after leaving behind that part
of themselves that they may consider most vital." STEPHEN CARTER, THE DISSENr
OF THE GOVERNED 90 (1998).
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making my decisions.1 3 6 Why then, simply because I make my
decisions on the basis of faith, am I forbidden to express the true
foundation for these decisions?
Clearly, it is neither fair nor equitable to force me to reject
or conceal my true justification, when an individual who decides
on the basis of economic considerations, scientific evidence, or
other permissible "publicly acceptable" grounds, is freely permit-
ted to express reliance on those grounds.'3 7 Even secular theo-
rist Richard Rorty, who seeks to keep religion out of the public
square through the "privatizing of religion,"138 insists that there
is "hypocrisy ... in saying that believers somehow have no right
to base their political views on their religious faith, whereas we
atheists have every right to base ours on Enlightenment philoso-
phy. The claim that in doing so we are appealing to reason,
whereas the religious are being irrational, is hokum."'39
Beyond these principles of practicality and fairness, the
admission of religious rationale into the secular arena is further
supported by obvious error in the "accessibility" argument,
described above. The perspective set forward in the preceding
section proposed that only those reasons that are "accessible" to
the public at large are legitimately public reasons, 140 and con-
cluded that religious grounds cannot be considered "publicly
accessible." However, religion is no less accessible-and indeed,
may be more accessible-than many other views permitted into
the public square.
"Accessibility," it turns out, has little to do with the beliefs,
values, and reasons that the actual citizens in a democracy
do in fact understand and use .... Complex scientific cal-
culations and abstruse philosophical notions may be
136. "[O] rdinary citizens should feel free to rely on convictions informed
by religious and other similar views when they consider difficult political issues."
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 122, at 7.
137. "In a democracy that is free and robust, an opinion is no more
disqualified for being 'religious' than for being atheistic, or psychoanalytic, or
Marxist, or just plain dumb.... Religion in public is but the public opinion of
those citizens who are religious." Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of
Religious Freedom, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1992, at 13.
138. See Rorty, supra note 117, at 2.
139. Id. at 4; see also GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 122,
at 101 ("If Kantian claims are to be allowed in the political process, explicit
religious claims cannot fairly be excluded.").
140. Rawls identified public reasons as "presently accepted general beliefs
and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods of science
when these are not controversial." JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 224
(1993), quoted in Ronald Dworkin et al., Lecture Transcript, The Fifth Annual Fritz
B. Burns Lecture: Euthanasia, Morality, and the Law, 30 Lov. L.A. L. REv. .1465,
1470.
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"accessible" even though ordinary citizens may find them
foreign or implausible, but religious values that are widely
accepted (and understood even by many citizens who do
not accept them) are not. "Accessibility" becomes little
more than an appealing catchword denoting the theorists'
preferred mode of political discourse.141
In the same way that nonreligious grounds may be "inaccessible,"
the "divisiveness" argument against religious expression is also
defeated; nonreligious grounds may be either equally as divisive
or more divisive than religion. "To be sure, religion often has
been divisive, leading to sectarian conflict and persecution. But
there also have been many divisions over political values not con-
sidered religious, and many of these divisions also have caused
strife."' 42 In this way, both the accessibility and the divisiveness
arguments for the exclusion of religious rationale prove too
much; "in each case, secular as well as religious belief appears to
fit the criterion."'43 Therefore, neither is an acceptable basis on
which to exclude religious rationale from public debate.
Beyond these responses to the claims made by those wishing
to exclude religion, independent arguments likewise justify the
inclusion of religious rationale in public debate on religious
human rights. The first is the conclusion, arrived at in Part III,
that the religious viewpoint provides a much-needed founda-
tional framework for the field of religious human rights. 4 4 "The
task of the religious believer-Jewish, Christian or Muslim-is to
provide a better foundation for the moral claims of a secular
realm where the vast majority of whose citizens profess religious
belief, and indeed, see their very allegiance to that secular realm
141. Smith, supra note 132, at 1015. This understanding of accessibility
will not come as a surprise to many religious people, who "do not think that their
fundamental convictions are less than fully accessible; they suppose these
convictions can be established on grounds that are subject to general rational
evaluation." GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 122, at 39
(emphasis in original).
142. Greene, supra note 120, at 1616 n.23. Greene's explanation
continues: "The organized nature of some religions might make it more likely
that groups of people will have power to act against dissenters, but there are
plenty of organized nonreligious groups that take controversial political
positions." Id.; see also PERRY, RELIGION, supra note 119, at 47-48 ("To be sure,
religious discourse in public . . . is sometimes quite sectarian and therefore
divisive. But religiously based moral discourse is not necessarily more sectarian
than secular moral discourse. It can be much less sectarian.").
143. Greene, supra note 120, at 1616.
144. For a full discussion of this conclusion, see Part III.C, supra
(discussing the essential contribution the religious community is capable of
making to the human rights enterprise-a comprehensive depth of
philosophical framework).
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as itself being religious. "145 To attempt to preserve and protect
religious human rights on purely secular grounds is both illogical
and ineffective; therefore, admission of religious rationale to the
public debate is essential.
Even if secular advocates do not agree that the religious
rationale should serve as the foundation for religious human
rights, the introduction of religious language into political dis-
cussion should be permitted as an alternative, at the very least. It
is patently illogical to prohibit a religious advocate from entering
the debate concerning religious freedom, simply due to the reli-
gious nature of his argument.
146
Yet there is more at stake than fairness. According to the
logic of either the free marketplace of ideas or of religious free-
dom itself, truth will emerge only if all voices are permitted to
enter the debate. As Michael Perry has stated:
Rather than try to do the impossible-maintain a wall of
separation between the religiously based moral discourse
that inevitably and properly takes place in public culture
on the one side and the discourse that takes place in public
political debate on the other side-we should simply wel-
come the presentation of religiously based moral argu-
ments in all areas of our public culture, including public
debate specifically about contested political choices.
Indeed .... we should not merely welcome but encourage
the presentation of such arguments in public political
debate-so that we can test them there."
1 4 7
Clearly, some arguments, whether religious or secular, will "have
more to offer than others, and . . . accordingly are entitled to
more attention and public consideration."1 48 Yet, in the market-
place of ideas, truth will emerge if we allow all views and opinions
into public debate, whether or not we understand them or agree
with them.14 9 "We do not have (and we should not have) so
secure a notion of public consensus, or such stringent require-
145. Novak, supra note 113, at 177.
146. Related to the context of public discourse in the United States, one
author states that the principle of religious equality requires "that we fully
protect the free exercise and free speech rights of all religious believers,
including their right to attempt to influence the law and public policy." Daniel
Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role of Competing
Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 2 (1993).
147. PERRY, RELIGION, supra note 119, at 47 (emphasis in original)
(parenthetical notations deleted).
148. Conkle, supra note 146, at 2.
149. John Stuart Mill describes the concept of truth emerging from a free
marketplace of ideas as follows:
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ments of fairness in debate, as to exclude any view from having
its effect on the marketplace of ideas." 5 °
C. The Conclusion: No Compromise
As a Christian advocate for religious human rights, I can-
not"'-indeed, I must not-alter my identity in order to enter
We have now recognized the necessity... of freedom of opinion,
and freedom of the expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds;
which we will now briefly recapitulate.
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for
aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our
own infallibility.
Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and
very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general
or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth,
it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the
truth has any chance of being supplied.
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the
whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is vigorously and
earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in
the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its
rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the
doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and
deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma
becoming a mere formal profession. Inefficacious for good, but
cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and
heartfelt conviction from reason or personal experience.
JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ESSAYS ON PoLTrrics AND SOCIETY 213, 257-58
(Robson ed., 1977).
150. Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 817, 842 (1993). Waldron explains what is at stake:
Even if people are exposed in argument to ideas over which they
are bound to disagree-and how could any doctrine of public
deliberation preclude that?-it does not follow that such exposure is
pointless or oppressive. For one thing, it is important for people to be
acquainted with the views that others hold. Even more important,
however, is the possibility that my own view may be improved, in its
subtlety and depth, by exposure to a religion or a metaphysics that I
am initially inclined to reject. . . . [W]e all have at one time or
another, [had the experience] of having argued with someone whose
world view was quite at odds with our own, and of having come away
thinking, "I'm sure he's wrong, and I can't follow much of it, but, still,
it makes you think .... " The prospect of losing that sort of effect in
public discourse is, frankly, frightening-terrifying, even, if we are to
imagine it being replaced by a kind of "deliberation" that, in the name
of "fairness" or "reasonableness" (or worse still, "balance") consists of
bland appeals to harmless nostrums that are accepted without
question on all sides.
Id. at 841-42.
151. The impossibility of forced concealment of religious rationale has
been analogized to a form of moral "schizophrenia." See NEUHAUS, supra note
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the public debate. 152 Whether or not it is recognized or
respected by secular society, my faith has a profound impact on
my life, my work, my decisions, and my advocacy. 153 I enter "the
public square, then, not as an anonymous citizen but as a person
shaped by 'other sources' that are neither defined by nor sub-
servient to the public square. '15 4
A number of factors lead to my conclusion, that I not con-
ceal my religious rationale and identity when I enter the public
debate. First and foremost, the Bible itself instructs me not to.
Christ described believers as the "light of the world," as a "city on
a hill" that cannot be hidden. The light of our faith is something
we are instructed to "shine before men."'
155
The reasons why I must not conceal my faith go further than
biblical admonition, however. As explained in the previous sec-
tion describing the current challenge, I recognize that if I enter
the public arena with my religious identity and rationale in full
view, I will likely be ignored, criticized, or maligned. However, if
because of this threat I choose to be silent about my true motiva-
tion and personality, regardless of any short-term success or
agreement that may result, I am diminishing my cause in the
116, at 125 (In the public square, "[t]he assertion of a moral claim is
[considered] an 'imposition' upon a presumably value-free process. Morally
serious people, however, cannot divide themselves so neatly. Democracy does
not require and cannot survive such a schizophrenic demand.").
152. Referring to a religious person's involvement in secular debate,
Neuhaus concludes: "Although she may not speak in the political arena in the
same way she speaks in church, the moral political actor is the same person in
both situations." Id. at 125.
153. Using the work of Martin Luther King, Jr., as an example, it is
interesting to note that secular society often incorrectly assumes the following:
[M]atters of public significance must be sanitized of religious
particularity. It regularly occurred that the klieg lights for the
television cameras would be turned off during Dr. King's speeches
when he dwelt on the religious and moral-philosophical basis of the
movement for racialjustice. They would be turned on again when the
subject touched upon confrontational politics. In a luncheon
conversation, Dr. King once remarked, "They aren't interested in the
why of what we're doing, only in the what of what we're doing, and
because they don't understand the why they cannot really understand
the what."
Id. at 98 (emphasis in original).
154. Id. at 128.
155. In the gospel of Matthew, Jesus instructed:
You are the light of the world. A city on a hill cannot be hidden.
Neither do people light a lamp and put it under a bowl. Instead they
put it on its stand, and it gives light to everyone in the house. In the
same way, let your light shine before men, that they may see your good
deeds and praise your Father in heaven.
Matthew 5:14-16.
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long term. As Neuhaus has eloquently stated: "By divesting our-
selves of authoritative moral referents that are external to our-
selves, such as religion proposes, we have acquiesced in the
judgment that there is no moral appeal beyond the individualis-
tic pursuit of interests." '156 My acquiescence merely perpetuates
the problem.
15 7
Much of the animosity and criticism between the religious
and the secular human rights communities may be attributed to
mutual ignorance or misunderstanding.' 58 As a Christian in a
predominately secular arena, I may be able to have some influ-
ence, to educate, or to clear up some of the misunderstandings
the secular community has of Christians. And yet, I can only
hope to have this effect if I enter the arena and engage in the
fray, while not yielding to the pressure to conceal my religious
roots.
In Neuhaus' perspective concerning the absence of religion
from the public square, "[a]t one level, it can be said that the
prevailing situation is extremely nondemocratic. At another
level, more closely related to sociological theory, it must be said
that the situation cannot be sustained.... The broken conversa-
tion between religion and the business of the polis must be re-
established." 5 9
When I say that I must not conceal my religious identity or
convictions, that is not a license for either dogmatic orjudgmen-
tal behavior on my part. I can also only hope to have the positive
156. NEUHAUS, supra note 116, at 126.
157. Edward Luttwak describes "the problem" as follows:
Policy makers, diplomats, journalists, and scholars who are ready
to over-interpret economic causality, who are apt to dissect social
differentiations more finely, and who will minutely categorize political
affiliations, are still in the habit of disregarding the role of religion,
religious institutions, and religious motivations in explaining politics
and conflict, and even in reporting their concrete modalities. Equally,
the role of religious leaders, religious institutions, and religiously
motivated lay figures in conflict resolution has also been
disregarded-or treated as a marginal phenomenon hardly worth
noting.
This does not necessarily have anything "to do with personal
attitudes toward religion" but with "a learned repugnance to contend
intellectually with all that is religion or belongs to it-a complex
inhibition compounded out of the peculiar embarrassment that many
feel when faced by explicit manifestations of serious religious
sentiment."
Edward Luttwak, The Missing Dimension, in RELIGION: THE MISSING DIMENSION OF
STATEcRAFr 8, 9-10 (1994), quoted in MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 198.
158. See supra Part III.
159. NEUHAUS, supra note 116, at 99.
1999] RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS & THE INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY 495
effect described above if I strike a difficult balance-I must seek
and promote the truth, in humility and love. Furthermore, I am
not claiming that every discussion or decision will require me to
actively identify myself as a Christian, pull out my Bible, or speak
in religious terminology. While my Christian identity and reli-
gious rationale should be an integral component of my work in
the secular human rights community, I also should be sensitive in
discerning occasions when it is both appropriate and necessary
for me to express myself in terms of my faith.
I concede that there may be times where in order to obtain
support and agreement on a particular point or for a specific
endeavor, I will have to resort to seeking neutral (i.e., secular)
"common ground." Finding common ground is indeed an essen-
tial key to effective advocacy. It is not essential, however, to
assume that I have no choice but to "secularize" my views each
time I enter a public debate. Indeed, finding common ground
might similarly mean finding a religious rationale with which my
nonreligious counterparts can agree. Or it may mean arriving at
a common decision that is consistent with both the religious and
the secular justification.
The words of Lawrence Solum, written in the context of
public debate over euthanasia, shed light on the context of reli-
gious human rights as well:
When we debate the legal issues raised by euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide, we can search for common
ground, rather than focus on the questions that divide us.
This is not to say that we can or should disregard our most
fundamental beliefs about ultimate matters when we
debate euthanasia in public. It is to say that we should
search for the ways in which our deepest beliefs converge and over-
lap with those of our fellow citizens.... The belief in the sanc-
tity of human life, the belief that suffering should be
alleviated, and the belief that human dignity requires free-
dom and self-determination-these are values that are
widely shared. . . . A patient and respectful search for
agreement using the common resources of our shared
public reason may repay us with understanding and
reconciliation. 160
Therefore, although it may be necessary at times to seek com-
mon neutral ground in order to win support, I must also both
retain and reflect the unique religious rationale on which my
position is founded. I do so with the hope of persuading others
160. Dworkin et al., supra note 140, at 1472 (portion quoted written by
Lawrence Solum) (emphasis added).
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that a religious foundation for religious human rights is not only
viable but is, as I believe, a more effective philosophical frame-
work upon which to frame the efforts of both communities.
EAPILOGUE: "COMMON GROUND FOR MUTUAL SUPPORT"
' 16 1 "
Despite their difficult and paradoxical relationship, religion and
human rights must not only be reconciled, but indeed support each
other. This can and should be achieved, I believe, through efforts
on both sides of the issue. Secular human rights advocates, on the
one hand, must transcend an attitude of indifferent tolerance of
religion to a moral recognition of religious faith and serious
engagement of religious perspectives. Those who take religion seri-
ously, on the other hand, must see human rights as integral to




The challenge we face, as advocates of religious human
rights, is an increasingly demanding one.
The growth of religious pluralism is worldwide and consti-
tutes one of the major challenges facing all the religions of
the world today. The increasing presence of multiple
faiths in secular societies makes religious isolation impossi-
ble and interfaith encounters inevitable .... The call for
recognition of religious human rights in the world commu-
nity needs to be sounded by the religions themselves as
well as by instruments of national and international
law .... Religious liberty, like world peace, is not only a
moral imperative worthy of universal support around the
world, it also needs to be seen as essential for the creation
of a world community and may well prove to be crucial in
the survival of the human family.
163
Although the task is daunting, there is hope. Yet, only in work-
ing together will we be equal to the task. As the statement of
Abdullahi Ahmed An-na'im, above, indicates, religion and secu-
lar human rights must not only be reconciled but must support
one another in order to succeed in the challenge before us.
161. Abdullahi Ahmed An-na'im, Islamic Foundations of Religious Human
Rights, in RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 337, 341 (identifying the
need for both secular human rights and religion to seek "common ground for
mutual support").
162. Id. at 34041.
163. Wood, supra note 10, at 482.
1999] RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS & THE INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY 497
As a Christian advocate for religious human rights, in order
to be effective in the short term, I must attempt to discern the
occasions when neutral common ground is necessary. And yet,
to help build a foundation for long-term mutual understanding
and cooperation, I must both retain and openly display my Chris-
tian identity and religious rationale. It is my hope that by doing
so, I can in some small way help to bridge the chasm between the
factions. More importantly, I hope to identify "common ground"
which will advance the enterprise of religious human rights one
step closer to both justice and truth.
In order for religion and human rights to be reconciled and
support one another, the search for common ground is not my
task alone. My secular counterparts also must act-they must be
willing to take the difficult step of "suspension of disbelief," to
listen to the religious rationale with an open mind, and to learn
from what it has to offer. In this way, together we will be
strengthened to fight the evils of injustice and religious intoler-
ance, and together we will eagerly anticipate the day of universal
respect for religious human rights.

